






























1. History of EU-Turkey Relations1 
1.1 Sceptical public opinion and a troubled relationship  
Opposition to Turkish accession to the European Union (EU) has been at outstandingly high 
levels both in public opinion and amongst political actors in Austria. Eurobarometer and other 
surveys have constantly identified values of 65% to over 80% of respondents opposed to Turkish 
membership since 2005. In this context, the established government parties, the Christian-
deŵoĐƌatiĐ AustƌiaŶ People͛s PaƌtǇ ;ÖVPͿ aŶd the “oĐial DeŵoĐƌatiĐ PaƌtǇ of Austƌia ;“PÖ), have 
ďeeŶ at ďest lukeǁaƌŵ iŶ suppoƌtiŶg the EU͛s aĐĐessioŶ ŶegotiatioŶs ǁith TuƌkeǇ, shoƌt of 
torpedoing the procedure. In the case of the ÖVP, the reluctance to embrace Turkish 
membership mirrors a scepticism also present on the centre-right in Germany or France. The 
coalition between the ÖVP and the right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) delayed 
the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005. 
Strikingly, the social-deŵoĐƌatiĐ paƌtǇ has ďeeŶ less eŶthusiastiĐ ƌegaƌdiŶg TuƌkeǇ͛s accession to 
the EU than its counterparts in other EU member states. In part, this can be explained by the 
influence of public opinion in Austria. Additionally, there is also a more fundamental concern 
within the Austrian labour movement regarding the expected labour market pressures following 
EU enlargement towards economically less developed countries such as Turkey. 
The FPÖ, as well as minor populist parties with temporary parliamentary representation, have 
always voiced their opposition to the prospect of Turkey acceding the EU very clearly. The same 
applies to the influential tabloid newspaper Die Krone, which has a wide readership and 
frequently used this leverage to campaign for its preferred policy outcomes. The Green party has 
been the only established political force that in principle and under the condition of genuine 
reforms in the fields of civil rights, democracy and rule of law favours a Turkish EU accession. In a 
similar line of argumentation, representatives of a traditionally weak liberal tradition in politics 
and the media also support accession, considering it an instrument for the Europeanisation of 
Turkey. 
In conclusion, the Austrian debate on EU-Turkey relations is closely intertwined with domestic 
politics and public opinion. Immigration is one of the most salient political topics, and the 
Tuƌkish ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ of aďout ϮϲϬ,ϬϬϬ people ƌepƌeseŶts oŶe of the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s laƌgest ŵigƌaŶt 
populations. It is not difficult to see how the prospect of Turkish accession to the EU could be 
linked to the issue of Turkish migration. The uniquely strong and early rise of the populist right 
since the late 1980s has benefitted from the mobilization of such concerns linked to 
immigration.  
                                                          
1
 The EU 28 Country Reports were completed before the Turkish Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017. 
Thus, the report does not take account of any potential changes in the national debate that might have 
occurred in the meantime. 
  
 








1.2 Shifting Austrian narratives about Turkey: From identities to values 
The main narrative in the Austrian conception of Turkey is an almost ideal-typical example of the 
ŶotioŶ of a Đultuƌal ͞Otheƌ͟. This ƌoots iŶ the iŵpeƌial peƌiod, iŶ ǁhiĐh the Haďsďuƌg Eŵpeƌoƌs 
faced the Ottoman Sultans in a confrontation between Christianity and Islam. The Ottoman 
sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 are two of the most iconic events reported in Austrian history 
textbooks. These far-fetched historical references have been revived in the discourse on Turkish 
labour migration. Beginning with a bilateral agreement with Turkey in 1964, the Austrian 
government had invited Turkish workers to come to Austria to compensate for labour shortages. 
These so-Đalled ͞guest ǁoƌkeƌs͟ ;͞Gastarbeiter͟) were initially intended to stay for a temporary 
period, but eventually many families settled and stayed. Today, the estimated number of 
Austrian residents of Turkish origin amounts to around 260,000. The populist anti-foreigner 
discourse often built on the reservoir of cultural animosities. One example was the 2005 
ĐaŵpaigŶ foƌ the VieŶŶese ŵuŶiĐipal eleĐtioŶs, iŶ ǁhiĐh the Fƌeedoŵ PaƌtǇ͛s slogaŶ ƌead 
͞VieŶŶa ŵust Ŷot ďeĐoŵe IstaŶďul͟. 
It must be noted that both large mainstream parties have been careful not to frame their 
position in terms of identity. Instead, they have focused their reservations on utilitarian 
arguments. For instance, they have repeatedly voiced the warning that the EU in its current 
institutional setup was not ready to take in another member state of such large size. They have 
also pointed out that the EU͛s eǆteƌŶal ďoƌdeƌs ǁould ďe eǆteŶded to the iŶstaďle Middle East 
and that the economic divergences between Turkey and the EU were simply too large for full 
economic integration at this stage. 
Over time, the explicitly cultural narrative receded into the background even in the discourse of 
the populist right, corresponding to a more general shift towards frames that centre on social 
and economic grievances since the financial crisis of 2008. With regards to relations to Turkey, 
the focus across the politiĐal speĐtƌuŵ has ŵoǀed to aƌguŵeŶtatioŶs ďased oŶ the ͞EuƌopeaŶ 
ǀalues͟ of deŵoĐƌaĐǇ aŶd huŵaŶ ƌights. The politiĐal ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ shaƌpeŶed its ƌhetoƌiĐ iŶ the 
context of the events of 2016, centred on criticism of the perceived authoritarian turn of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. It is however worth noticing that Austrian 
foreign policy usually adopts a position of dialogue when dealing with matters of democracy and 
human rights. From this point of view, it is all the more remarkable that Austria has been an 
outspoken defender of a hard line of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey. 
1.3 A debate dominated by immigration  
One of the main policy areas dominating the Austrian debates about EU-Turkey relations is 
evidently immigration in its various dimensions. One important aspect concerns the integration 
of citizens of Turkish origins into Austrian society, even though this is only indirectly related to 
the ƋuestioŶ of the EU͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith TuƌkeǇ. The disĐussioŶ aďout the iŵpaĐt of Tuƌkish EU 
accession on the labour market is also visibly related to the question of immigration. In addition, 
  
 








seĐuƌitǇ has ďeeŶ a ƌeĐuƌƌiŶg ĐoŶĐeƌŶ, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe peƌtaiŶiŶg to TuƌkeǇ͛s ĐoŶfliĐt-prone Eastern 
borders. In relation to the role of Islam and its compatibility with Western political systems, the 
area of democracy and human rights has also been touched upon occasionally. Finally, some 
specific EU policies, such as in the area of agriculture, were important for interest groups albeit 
less publicly salient. 
2. Future of EU-Turkey relations 
2.1 Shrinking prospects of cooperative relations 
As regards the future of EU-Turkey relations, Austria has shown a clear preference against a 
revitalization of membership talks, and even called for their suspension in the latest phase in 
2016. Surveys by the Austrian Society for European Politics have shown that in recent years, 
public opposition to enlargement in general, and Turkish accession in particular, has increased 
further. OŶlǇ ϭϬ peƌĐeŶt ǁould suppoƌt TuƌkeǇ͛s aĐĐessioŶ to the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ ;EUͿ. 
There are nonetheless divergences of views. One main criticism of the government position 
comes from the liberal defenders of EU enlargement policy as a tool for the Europeanisation of 
Turkey. From this perspective, the Austrian position for the suspension of talks is seen as a 
diplomatic mistake at a moment when cooperation and dialogue is needed. An underlying 
disagreement comes to the fore here, notably regarding the extent to which the government 
should follow public opinion rather than adapting to the complex necessities of international 
relations. From the latter point of view, it is more advisable to place Austria firmly in the 
European mainstream, and thereby contribute to an expanded international role of the EU. For 
instance, the outspokenly pro-European political scientist Anton Pelinka (Central European 
University) ǀoiĐed shaƌp ĐƌitiĐisŵ of the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s Đouƌse, ǁhiĐh, iŶ his ǀieǁ, atteŵpts to 
accommodate right-wing populism and neglects the pro-European opposition in Turkey. 
On the far-right, the populist FPÖ party continues to voice its hostility towards any closer 
relations between Turkey and the EU, including the cooperation on refugee movements agreed 
in March 2016. One of the main points of contention with regards to the joint statement that 
has beĐoŵe kŶoǁŶ as the ͞ƌefugee deal͟ ǁas the pƌoŵise of aĐĐeleƌatiŶg the pƌoĐeduƌe of 
lifting visa restrictions for Turkish citizens travelling to the Schengen area. On the other side of 
the political spectrum, there has been growing scepticism of Turkey ruled by the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government in response to increasing authoritarian tendencies, and, 
most iŵpoƌtaŶtlǇ, the Đollapse of the peaĐe pƌoĐess ǁith the KuƌdistaŶ Woƌkeƌs͛ PaƌtǇ ;PKKͿ. 
This attitude is reflected in parts of the social-democratic and green parties as well as a number 
of smaller left-wing groupings. 
The business community takes an interest in Turkey as a partner of the EU. This is 
understandable given the fact that Austrian investors are strongly engaged with the Turkish 
economy. The Austrian Chamber of Commerce reports that from 2002 to 2015, Austria has been 
  
 








the second largest provider of foreign direct investment with over USD 9 billion. However, it 
should be noted that the peak of Austrian investment activity in Turkey was reached between 
2009 and 2011 and has since decreased. The business community does in any case not take a 
strong political position as to its preferences for future EU-Turkey relations. The long-time 
president of the Chamber of Commerce has made clear that the priority lies in the deepening of 
economic rather than political ties, for instance through a participation of Turkey in the 
European Economic Area. 
2.2 Open-ended talks and privileged partnership 
Austrian government representatives have repeatedly stressed that accession negotiations 
should Ŷot autoŵatiĐallǇ lead to full Tuƌkish EU ŵeŵďeƌship ďut ĐoŶstitute aŶ ͞opeŶ-eŶded͟ 
process. In this spirit, the notion of a privileged partnership between Turkey and the EU has 
been mentioned as a potential alternative to full accession at several times, in line with 
proposals put forward by German conservatives. However, this idea has today lost much of its 
credit in comparison to the 2000s, when a rapprochement between Turkey and the EU was 
observable – for instance, when Austria demanded that the option should be considered in the 
final phase before accession negotiations were opened in October 2005. While the debate 
presently focuses on navigating the acute tensions between the countries, the centre-right ÖVP 
party nonetheless presented a largely neglected paper on the future EU-Turkey relations. The 
pƌoposal dispeŶses the ŶotioŶ of pƌiǀileged paƌtŶeƌship aŶd Đalls foƌ a ͞uŶioŶ of iŶteƌests͟ 
instead. The main pillars of such a union would be cooperation in the areas of internal and 
external security, an extended customs union and further dialogue on human rights. At the same 
time, however, perspectives for full EU accession or complete freedom of movement were not 
included. 
2.3 Recent events and the hardening of the Austrian position 
The current debate was strongly influenced by the dramatic events of 2015 and 2016, 
concerning the refugee question as well as domestic Turkish politics. In this context, Austrian 
objections to Turkish membership have become even stronger and have led to a renewed 
ĐoŶfliĐt ďetǁeeŶ the tǁo ĐouŶtƌies͛ goǀeƌŶŵeŶts. AlƌeadǇ iŶ the ƌuŶ-up to the open crisis in EU-
Turkey relations in late 2016, actions of the ruling AKP party had antagonised Austrian politics. 
For instance, the ǀisit of ‘eĐep TaǇǇip EƌdoğaŶ, paƌtǇ leadeƌ at the tiŵe, to VieŶŶa to giǀe a 
speech to the Turkish community before the 2014 Turkish presidential elections led to criticism 
from across the political spectrum – a controversy that is at the time of writing to repeat itself in 
an even more heated climate before the constitutional referendum in April 2017. Indeed, since 
the AKP goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s haƌsh ƌeaĐtioŶ to the Gezi paƌk pƌotests iŶ ϮϬϭϯ, also liďeƌal oďseƌǀeƌs 
have become more pessimistic about a Turkish EU perspective.  
The year 2016, witnessing the EU-TuƌkeǇ ͞ƌefugee deal͟ iŶ MaƌĐh, the atteŵpted ŵilitaƌǇ Đoup 
on 15 July and a geŶeƌal souƌiŶg of the EU͛s ƌelatioŶs ǁith TuƌkeǇ iŶ its folloǁ-up, marks a 
  
 








breaking point. The refugee deal, including the promise of accelerated visa liberalisation for 
Turkish citizens, has called forth opposition from various quarters. Besides the usual right-wing 
concerns regarding immigration and hence visa liberalisation, there is a now also a stronger case 
to make against cooperation with Turkey on the basis of human rights. The Turkish 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ƌeaĐtioŶ to the failed Đoup atteŵpt of JulǇ ŵotiǀated the ƌeĐeŶtlǇ appoiŶted 
social-democratic Federal Chancellor Christian Kern to conclude that Turkey was leaving the 
grounds of rule of law and to call for an end to the accession talks. In November 2016, all six 
parliamentary parties issued a joint statement that condemned the human rights situation in 
Turkey and called on the EU to suspend negotiations. 
This was carried further by Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz in a December 2016 meeting of the 
Council of the EU. When his demand to freeze accession negotiations did not find any other 
suppoƌteƌs aŵoŶgst the Ϯϴ foƌeigŶ ŵiŶisteƌs, he ďloĐked the adoptioŶ of the ŵeetiŶg͛s 
conclusions. The controversy over the failed coup attempt was largely amplified after Viennese 
residents of Turkish origin came together for spontaneous, unregistered demonstrations in 
support of the AKP government, which included reported Islamic chants and a violent incident at 
a Kuƌdish ƌestauƌaŶt. This episode is Ǉet aŶotheƌ eǆaŵple foƌ the iŶteƌƌelatedŶess of Austƌia͛s 
domestic politics and its position on the European stage in relation to Turkey. 
3. EU-Turkey Relations and the Neighbourhood/Global scene 
3.1 Instability in the neighbourhood as further obstacle to 
rapprochement 
Neighbourhood issues and global developments do not figure prominently in the Austrian 
deďate oŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith the EU. As has ďeeŶ ƌepeatedlǇ aƌgued heƌe, ŵuĐh of the 
debate hinges oŶ the dǇŶaŵiĐs of the doŵestiĐ ĐoŶteǆt. NoŶetheless, Austƌia͛s geŶeƌallǇ 
sceptical stance towards enlargement of the EU towards the East and the South stems not least 
from the image of this European neighbourhood as a troubled area. It is not deemed desirable to 
eǆteŶd the EU͛s ďoƌdeƌs iŶto aŶ aƌea of iŶstaďilitǇ. The iŵpaĐt of this ǀieǁ is eǀeŶ stƌoŶgeƌ Ŷoǁ 
that the pƌoteĐtioŶ of Euƌope͛s eǆteƌŶal ďoƌdeƌs, espeĐiallǇ as a consequence of the refugee 
crisis following the Syrian civil war, has become a highly salient issue in public debate across the 
ĐoŶtiŶeŶt. This suggests that TuƌkeǇ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeĐeiǀe AustƌiaŶ appƌoǀal foƌ its EU aĐĐessioŶ 
ambitions have not improved.  
Despite the recent strain on relations with Turkey, the Austrian government has stated its 
commitment to the agreement reached between the EU and Turkey to curb refugee movements 
over the Mediterranean – the so-called refugee deal of 18 March 2016. This is part of a wider 
recognition that cooperation with Turkey in questions of security and migration is indispensable. 
In light of the existing differences, this view is at present usually voiced in a subdued and vague 
manner, without specifying strategic options to move ahead. However, the need for close 
  
 








cooperation with Turkey on security issues is an important element of the above-mentioned 
ÖVP proposal for a future EU-TuƌkeǇ ͞uŶioŶ of iŶteƌest͟. It iŶĐludes Đalls foƌ deepeƌ ĐoopeƌatioŶ 
in justice and home affairs as well as in foreign and security policy. 
 
3.2 The OSCE as a basis for new cooperation? 
Austria took over the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) for the year 2017 and defined three priorities in this regard: defusing existing conflicts, 
fighting radicalization and violent extremism, and rebuilding trust and confidence between the 
57 participating states. This programme could help to identify some common ground on which 
fruitful cooperation between Austria and Turkey is possible outside of the EU framework. As to 
the fiƌst pƌioƌitǇ, TuƌkeǇ͛s iŵŵediate neighbourhood is affected by conflicts in Nagorno-
Karabakh and Georgia, both within the realm of the OSCE. A second priority concerns the fight 
against radicalisation and violent extremism – an area in which both countries share overlapping 
interests and could benefit from closer cooperation. For instance, numerous young Austrians 
have in the past years allegedly travelled to Syria to fight for ISIS, possibly passing through 
Turkey. Closer cooperation between the relevant authorities could help shutting down this 
route. Finally, rebuilding trust and confidence within the OSCE is a more generally framed 
objective, but one that can easily be seen as an important measure in the specific relationship 
between Austria and Turkey as well. 
3.3 Uncertainty in the global arena and the Austrian debate 
With regards to other global developments, the same mechanism as in the immediate 
neighbourhood applies. The Austrian public exhibits a strong aversion to risky international 
involvement based on concerns for domestic seĐuƌitǇ as ǁell as the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s iŶteƌŶatioŶal 
status of neutrality. The current uncertainty about the international order only amplifies the 
unwillingness of Austrians to engage in external policy, be it within or beyond the European 
region. Outside of Europe this played a role when Austria withdrew its troops from the UN 
peacekeeping mission on the Golan Heights in 2013 in the context of the intensifying civil war in 
Syria. These concerns then also have an impact on public views of EU enlargement into a zone of 
instability, which easily translate into opposition to the accession of states in the Western 
Balkans and, above all, Turkey. 
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